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Abstract  While most bioeconomic models assume that vessel operators use
profit maximizing behavior, it is sometimes argued that participants use other
operational goals. The purpose of this paper is to compare how vessel behavior,
the bioeconomic equilibrium, and the path to achieve it are changed if partici-
pants use goal achievement behavior. It is shown that, depending on the
operational rule used to achieve the goal, there can be significant differences in
the amount of individual vessel effort at different stock sizes, and this can affect
the location and the stability of the bioeconomic equilibrium. In addition, goal
achievement behavior will generally lead to a larger open-access overshoot in
terms of fleet size.
Key words  Profit maximizing behavior, goal achievement behavior, open-ac-
cess fishery behavior.
JEL Classification Code  Q22.
Introduction
This paper is motivated by a series of discussions I have had over the years, princi-
pally with non-economists, about the behavior of fishing firms as the stock becomes
overfished. It was often contended that individual operators would compensate for
stock reductions by increasing effort. This phenomenon is sometimes said to be es-
pecially prevalent in artisinal fisheries. For example, Parks and Bonifaz (1994, p.
13) in a study of Ecuadorian fisheries state, “Diminished (fish) stocks lead produc-
ers to compete for smaller and smaller (harvests), while at the same time, artesonos
must continue to increase their effort to support their families from a dwindling
stock.” The implication was what appeared to be a rational individual response, in
the aggregate only made a bad situation worse. The stock would fall even further,
perhaps making it difficult to achieve stable bioeconomic equilibrium even when
there is vessel exit due to negative long-term profits. I would make the counter argu-
ment that if vessel profitability decreases with stock size, then if operators use profit
maximizing behavior (PMB), they would reduce effort as stock size decreased. This
reduction would reinforce the effect of reduced fleet size, thus speeding stock recov-
ery and increasing the probability of achieving a stable bioeconomic equilibrium.
Indeed, it is easy to construct a formal model based on PMB that demonstrates that
this will be the case. See below.
But as the reference to the Ecuadorian fishery illustrates, in some cases partici-
pants may base their behavior on goal achievement rather than profit maximization.
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The goal could be to achieve a specific profit level or to maintain a target effort or
harvest level. As a contrast to PMB, this will be called goal achievement behavior,
or GAB. As will be demonstrated below, in certain instances individual vessel effort
will increase with decreases in stock size if operators act in this manner.
There has been some research on how things other than simple profit maximiz-
ing behavior can influence decision making in fisheries. For example, Anderson
(1980) discusses how the effects of non-pecuniary benefits of fishing activity can af-
fect fishing behavior; Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) discuss how firms determine
which fishery to operate in; Charles (1988) discusses a range of non-economic is-
sues that affect behavior; and Holland and Sutinen (2000) show how habit can be as
important as relative profits in determining fishing location. However, as far as the
author has been able to determine, there has been no analogous work on alternative
hypotheses to explain the “intensity” of fishing once a decision has been made to
enter a particular fishery or to fish in a particular area or with a particular gear.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary analysis that compares the
operation of a fishery where participants maximize profits with an otherwise identi-
cal fishery where participants use GAB. The items to be compared are individual
vessel behavior, stock and fleet size at the bioeconomic equilibrium, and the likely
nature of the time path of stock and fleet size as the fishery approaches the equilib-
rium. The analysis adds new insights into the operation of an open-access fishery
and lays the groundwork for expanding the analysis of the effects of regulation on
individual behavior.
The paper will proceed as follows. The first main section introduces a standard
bioeconomic model that can be used to make the proposed comparisons. Because the
discussion can be facilitated by a graphical analysis, explicit functions with hypo-
thetical parameter values will be used. The next section describes different
operational rules that will allow vessels to achieve a specified profit level or main-
tain a target level of output or effort. A discussion of how the functional
relationships of the bioeconomic model are altered for each of the operational rules
is also included. The fourth section compares and contrasts vessel behavior, the
bioeconomic equilibrium, and the time path of the fishery for profit maximization
and different types of goal achievement. The next section introduces other issues
that arise given the possibility of GAB. The final section provides a summary and
offers suggestions for further research.
The Bioeconomic Fishery Model
The relevant issues can be captured in a Vernon Smith type model (Smith 1969),
where the vessel operator can choose both the amount of effort produced per day, e,
and the number of days fished per season, d. Assume homogeneous vessels with the
following daily profit function:
p(e, X) = PqXe –v1e – v2e2, (1)
where P is price of fish, qXe is the vessel daily production function (q is the
catchability coefficient and X is the stock size), and v1e + v2e2 is the quadratic daily
cost function. Let emax be the maximum e that can be produced in a day. The sea-
sonal profit function is:
P(e, d, X) = dp(e, X) – FC, (2)Goal Achievement Behavior 441
where FC is the annual fixed cost. Let Dmax be the maximum possible number of
days fished. Further, assume that stock growth is represented by the Schaefer (1954)
function:
G(X) = rX(1 – X/K), (3)
where K is the maximum stock size, and r is the intrinsic growth rate. The following
parameter values will be used in the graphical analysis: P = $17, q = 0.00005, v1 = 5,
v2 = 5, emax = 3.2, Dmax = 150, FC = $3000, r = 0.3, and K = 100,000.
Vessel Activity
Subject to technical constraints, daily profits are maximized where the first deriva-
tive of equation (1) equals zero. Therefore, the operational level of e will be:
e*(X) = emax if (PqX – v1)/2v2 ³ emax (4)
e*(X) = (PqX – v1)/2v2 if 0 < (PqX – v1)/2v2 < emax
e*(X) = 0 if (PqX – v1)/2v2 £ 0.
The stock size at which e*(X) falls to zero is important because it is the upper limit
on a range of stock sizes where commercial activity will cease. Call this stock size
the cushion stock size, Xcush, because it is a cushion that bounces the fishery time
path back up when the stock falls into this range. See below:
Xcush = v1/Pq. (5)
The profit-maximizing vessel will always choose to operate the maximum number
of days possible as long as daily profit is positive. Therefore:
d = Dmax if X > Xcush (6)
d = 0 if X £ Xcush.
Given the functions for e and d, total annual vessel effort, E, is:1
E(X) = de*(X). (7)
The stock size where long-run vessel profits equal zero when d = Dmax is the eco-
nomic equilibrium stock size, Xbe. It will occur at the combination of X and e where
both ¶B/¶e and P(X, e, Dmax) equal zero.
PqX – v1 – 2v2e = 0 (8)
PqXe – v1e – v2e2 – FC/Dmax = 0 (9)
1 Actually, since stock size will vary over the period, this is an approximation, but unless there are large
changes in stock size over the season, the differences are quite small. This approximation will be used to
simplify the graphical analysis.Anderson 442
2 All figures and time paths were derived using Microsoft EXCEL. While the exact shapes of the curves
follow from the given parameter values, the basic results are general.
Dividing equation (9) by e, subtracting it from equation (8), and solving for e ob-
tains:
ebe = [FC/(v2Dmax)]1/2. (10)
Substituting this back into equation (9) and solving for X obtains:
Xbe = [v1 + v2 ebe + FC/(ebeDmax)]/Pq.( 1 1 )
Vessel activity can be summarized in the relationships between X and the variables
e, d, and E as pictured in figures 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. As stated above, after
a point both daily and total annual vessel effort will decrease with stock size and
will fall to zero at a positive stock size. It is shown below that these patterns will
differ with GAB, and this will have interesting effects on fishery operation.
For purposes of the discussion below, consider a geometric interpretation of the
simultaneous solution of equations (8) and (9) for the equilibrium values of ebe and
Xbe in figure 1a.2 The solid thick curve follows from equation (8) and shows how the
operational level of e will vary with stock size. The solid thin line which follows
from equation (9) shows the levels of e which will generate a zero profit for differ-
ent levels of X assuming that d equals Dmax. It is impossible to cover fixed costs if X
is less than Xbe, but there are two levels of effort where this will occur when X is
larger than Xbe. Only the portion below emax is pictured. Call it the Zero Profit Curve
(ZPC). Because it will be part of the analysis of the operational rules for GAB be-
low, call the smaller of the two solutions emin(X). The ZPC shows the relevant
combinations of X and e where daily net returns will exactly cover fixed costs if d =
Dmax. All combinations of X and e on, above, and to the right of the curve will pro-
duce net returns equal to or greater than fixed costs. These represent the
combinations where it is theoretically possible to cover fixed costs. All combina-
tions to the left and below the curve will produce net returns less than fixed costs
even when d = Dmax.
The operational e curve represents the level of e where daily profits are maxi-
mized for various levels of X. The point where it intersects the ZPC represents the
combination of X and e where the highest possible daily profit will just cover fixed
cost when d = Dmax. This is the economic equilibrium stock size, Xbe. Two things that
follow from this graph will be useful in interpreting analogous graphs with GAB.
First, anytime the operational e curve, which can be different than e*(X) with GAB,
is above and to the right of the ZPC, it is possible to cover fixed costs. Second, the
point of intersection between the operational e curve and the ZPC will determine the
economic equilibrium stock size, which can be different than Xbe.
Bioeconomic Equilibrium
A fishery will be in a bioeconomic equilibrium when catch is equal to growth, so
stock size will not change. Simultaneously, long-run profits are equal to zero, so
there will be no tendency for vessel entry or exit. This point can be identified in
(fleet, stock) space by plotting the economic equilibrium curve (EEC) and the popu-
lation equilibrium curve (PEC). See Smith (1969), Anderson (1986, chapter 4), and
Hannesson (1993, chapter 2). The EEC is the collection of fleet and stock combina-Goal Achievement Behavior 443
Figures 1, 2, and 3.  Vessel and Fishery Behavior under
PMB and PGB with Cases 1 and 2
tions where long-run profit is equal to zero. All points above the EEC represent
combinations of X and V where long-run profits are positive and fleet size will in-
crease. The reverse holds true for all points below the curve. In this particular case,
since there is only one stock size where long-run profits will equal zero, the EEC
will be a horizontal line at Xbe (see equation 11). The population equilibrium curve
shows the combinations of stock and fleet sizes where catch will equal growth. An
equation for this curve can be obtained by equating stock growth and total fleet
catch and solving for V, the number of vessels is the fleet.
G(X) = VdeqX (12)
V = G(X)/deqXAnderson 444
Substituting in equations (3), (6), and (7) and simplifying obtains:
V = [r(1 – X/K)]/[Dmaxqe*(X)].
(12a)
As X decreases from K to Xcush, the numerator will increase and the denominator will
decrease, which means that V will vary inversely with stock size and will approach
infinity as X approaches Xcush from above. Because effort per boat decreases with
stock size, it takes more vessels to harvest the growth even as stock size falls. All
points to the left and below the PEC represent combinations of X and V where
growth is greater than catch and stock size will increase. The reverse holds true for
all points to the right or above it. The intersection of the EEC and the PEC deter-
mines the bioeconomic equilibrium. The particular EEC and PEC for the set of
parameters given above are depicted in figure 1d.
The Time Path of the Fishery
The phase plane diagram of the fishery is found by tracing the annual changes in
stock and fleet size. Stock size changes according to the difference between growth
and catch. The stock size difference equation is:
Xt+1 = Xt + G(Xt) – VtdtetqXt. (13)
Substituting in equations (3), (6), and (7) obtains:
Xt+1 = Xt + rXt(1 – Xt/K) – VtDmaxqXte*(Xt). (13a)
Following Smith (1969), the change in fleet size will be proportional to long-run
vessel profits. The vessel difference equation is:
Vt+1 = Vt + f{DmaxP[e*(Xt), Xt] – FC}. (14)
The parameter f is the entry/exit coefficient.
One purpose of this paper is to show how GAB will change the dynamics of an
otherwise identical fishery as compared to PMB. Therefore, it is necessary to set up
an initial case as a basis of comparison. The time path (or phase diagram) of fleet
and stock size for PMB, pictured in figure 1d, will serve that purpose. It is drawn
using the above parameters and a baseline entry/exit coefficient of 0.003. After an
“open-access overshoot,” the path makes a non-cyclical approach to the equilibrium.
In fact, once the time path approaches the PEC, it follows it very closely to the equi-
librium point. It is slightly below it and growth is greater than catch, so stock size is
growing. This is sometimes called a stable focus equilibrium (see Ferguson and Lim
1998). For purposes of later discussion, note that the (X,V) space is divided into four
quadrants by the PEC and the EEC. The time path in this case passes through three
of them.
For a given set of economic and biological parameters, the shape of the time
path is related to the absolute size of the entry/exit coefficient. At low levels, the
time path moves directly to the equilibrium point and remains in the same quadrant
from which it begins. This is called a stable node equilibrium. As the coefficient is
increased over some intermediate range, the path changes to a focus equilibrium
which can go through all quadrants, sometimes more than once, in a decreasingGoal Achievement Behavior 445
cycle on the way to equilibrium. The higher the F, the more cycles it takes to reach
equilibrium. Eventually, if F gets high enough, the path goes into a non-decreasing
cycle around the equilibrium.
The baseline F used in figure 1 has been selected so that the time path for PMB
is firmly in the range of a stable focus equilibrium. See row 1 of table 1, which de-
scribes how the time path changes as F changes relative to the baseline level. If it is
reduced to 10% of the baseline value, the path changes to a stable node. From that
level up to a point four times the baseline value, the time path remains a stable fo-
cus. The coefficient has to increase by a factor of 10 before the time path changes to
a non-decreasing cycle. The remaining rows in the table describe the relative stabil-
ity of the fishery system with different GAB scenarios and will be discussed further.
Introducing Goal Achievement Behavior into the Bioeconomic Model
Consider first the case where the goal is to achieve a specific level of profit. For
purposes here, it will be assumed that participants shoot for a level of annual net re-
turns that will exactly cover fixed costs. This can be justified on the notion that,
properly defined, FC includes the full opportunity cost of alternative uses of human
and physical capital. A lower profit goal will not allow for a viable operation. While
a higher goal is possible, it will only affect the stock size at which the profit goal
cannot be met (see the discussion below), and it will not affect the qualitative nature
of the results.
Since for any X there are many combinations of e and d that cause net returns to
equal FC, what operational rules can vessel operators use to choose a particular
combination? The following will be considered here.
Case 1  Set d equal to Dmax and use e as a control variable to cause net returns to
equal FC.
Case 2  Set e equal to e*(X) and use d as a control variable to cause net returns to
equal FC.
Case 3  Set e to a fixed level and use d as a control variable to cause net returns to
equal FC.
Case 4  Set daily catch, y, to a fixed level, then set e to obtain it and use d as a
control variable to cause net returns to equal FC.
Case 1 might be selected if there were a desire to spread the harvest throughout the
season, while Case 2 might be chosen if increasing leisure time were a secondary
goal. Cases 1 and 2 are similar in that they each choose one of the two control vari-
ables according to PMB. As a result, the economic equilibrium stock size, and
ultimately the bioeconomic equilibrium, will be the same as with PMB. Cases 3 or 4
would apply if daily trips are defined in terms of effort or catch because of custom
or vessel characteristics. Except for a special case, there will be a different
bioeconomic equilibrium. The cushion stock size will also be different.
As mentioned above, the ZPC divides the (e, X) space in figure 1a into areas
where fixed costs can (and cannot) be covered. Essentially this means that when
stock size is below Xbe, the profit goal cannot be met even when d = Dmax. This raises
the question of how vessel operation under PGB will change in this range. It is logi-
cal that operators will choose their control variable (e or d) such that they come as
close as possible to meeting the profit goal. Therefore, in Case 1 where e is the con-
trol variable, when X is less than Xbe, it can be assumed that operators will set e
equal to e*(X). This will provide the largest contribution toward covering fixedAnderson 446
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costs. They will stop fishing when e*(X) falls to zero at Xcush. In cases 2, 3, and 4,
where d is the control variable, the operators will set d equal to Dmax because given
their fixed level of e or y, this will provide the largest contribution towards FC. In
all cases, they will stop fishing when daily net returns fall to zero. For case 2, the
stock size where this occurs will be the same as with PMB, but in cases 3 and 4, it
will vary with the selected constant level of e or y.
A final, unresolved issue is the entry and exit of vessels with this type of GAB.
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that net returns will be less than FC
when X is less than Xbe, so the assumption concerning exit behavior in the PMB
model can still apply. However, because profit will equal zero by assumption as long
as X is greater than Xbe, it cannot be assumed that entry is proportional to profit. But,
it is reasonable to assume that entry is directly related to the ease with which the
profit goal can be achieved as measured by the difference between the operational
level of the control variable and the level where profits would be maximized. To be
explicit:
Entry
Vt+1 = Vt + F¢ [e*(X) – eci(X)]  when  X > Xbe(ci)   Case 1 (15a)
Vt+1 = Vt + F¢ [Dmax – dci(X)]  when  X > Xbe(ci)   Case 2,3,4  (15b)
Exit
Vt+1 = Vt + F [dci p(eci, Xt) – FC]  when  X £ Xbe(ci). (15c)
The terms dci and eci are the operational levels of e and d for the various cases
which, depending on the circumstances, can depend on X. Xbe(ci) is the actual
bioeconomic equilibrium stock size of the particular case. As noted above, it can be
different under PGB depending on the exact assumptions.
Note that equations (15a) and (15b) are strictly analogous to the profit related
formulation because the terms that are multiplied by the entry coefficient are equal
to zero at Xbe(ci) and are monotonically increasing in X above Xbe(ci). Therefore, the
general nature of entry with change in stock size will be the same. However, the ac-
tual number of entering vessels will depend upon the absolute size of the terms in
parentheses and of the entry coefficient.
Because the values of P in equation (14) and of [e*(X) – eci(X)] and [Dmax – dci(X)]
in equations (15a) and (15b) will differ at the same values of X, it is necessary to
calibrate the value of F¢ to maintain comparability. In all the profit goal achieve-
ment cases, the baseline F¢ was set such that it generated the same amount of entry
at a stock size of 75*K, which was generated in the PMB model with F of 0.003 at
the same stock size.
The second type of GAB is to attempt to maintain a constant effort or catch
level on a daily basis, for the reasons discussed above, but then to operate their
boats every day. Vessel entry/exit is proportional to profits. While fundamentally
different in principle, these turn out to be slight modifications of Cases 3 and 4 as
follows:
Case 5. Set e to a fixed level and then operate so that d = Dmax.
Case 6. Set y to a fixed level, then set e to obtain it and operate so that d = Dmax.
Consider now how these six cases can be incorporated into the bioeconomic
model. Recall that the model consists of equations (4), (6), and (7), the operationalAnderson 448
levels of e, d, and E; equations (5) and (11), the economic equilibrium and the cush-
ion stock sizes; equation (12), the PEC; and equations (13) and (14), the difference
equations for stock and fleet size. Given the extra assumptions concerning how the e
and d functions change when the profit goal cannot be met, it is a simple matter to
apply the basic bioeconomic model to each of the cases. Once the operational rule
for eci is specified, where the subscript refers to the case number, it is possible to
calculate the values of Xbe(ci) and Xcush(ci). It is then possible to construct the other
equations by substituting eci, Xbe(ci), and Xcush(ci) in the appropriate places. The basic
form of the other equations will be the same in all cases. Table 2 describes how this
is done for Cases 1 through 4. Cases 5 and 6 will be the same as Cases 3 and 4, re-
spectively, except that d will always equal Dmax, and the V difference equation will
be given by equation (14).
Except in a few cases, the results should be obvious by inspection. First, there
are constraints on the levels of e and y that can be chosen in Cases 3 and 4. The low-
est e must be greater than emin(K), the effort level where the profit goal is achieved
given the boat operates full time when stock size is at its maximum. It may not be
higher than emax. The constraints in Case 4 are analogous but in terms of output. Sec-
ond, the solutions for Xbe(ci) and Xcush(ci) are found by setting equations (2) and (1)
equal to zero, respectively, when e = eci and d = Dmax and solving for X. In Case 4,
the equations will be quadratic and the appropriate solutions are the positive value
provided by the general equation. These solutions will not apply when the amount of
e necessary to catch the fixed y at the solution level of X is greater than emax. Finally,
Table 2
The Bioeconomic Model Equations for the Different Operational Rules
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Daily Effort ec1(X) = emin(X) ec2(X) = e*(X) ec3 = efixed ec4(X) = Min[ yfixed/qX, emax]
if X > Xbe
ec1(X) = e*(X) emin(K) < efixed £ emax
if X £ Xbe emin(K)qKyfixed £ emaxqK
Equilibrium XX be(c1) = Xbe Xbe(c2) = Xbe Xbe(c3) = [v1 + v2ec3 Xbe(c4) = [–b + (b2
(EEC) + FC/ec3Dmax]/Pq – 4ac)1/2]/2a
a = Pyc4 – FC/Dmax
b = v1(yc4/q)
c = v2(yc4/q)2
Cushion XX cush(c1) = Xcush Xcush(c2) = Xcush Xcush(c3) = [v1 + Xcush(c4) = [–b + (b2
v2ec3]/Pq – 4ac)1/2]/2a
a = Pyc4 – FC/Dmax
b = v1(yc4/q)
c = v2(yc4/q)2
Days Fished dci = Min{FC/B[eci,X],Dmax} if X > Xcush(ci)
dci = 0 if X £ Xcush(ci)
EE ci = dcieci
PEC V = G(X)/dcieciqX
X Difference Equation Xt+1 = Xt + G(X) – Vtdci(t)eci(t)qXt
V Difference Equation See Equations 15a, 15b, and 15cGoal Achievement Behavior 449
the general equation for dci applies in case 1 because, by definition, FC/p[ec1,X] will
equal Dmax.
Comparisons of Open Access with Profit Maximization and Profit Goal
Achievement Behavior
Comparing and contrasting the operation of the fishery when participants use the
various operational rules can be accomplished by constructing a set of graphs analo-
gous to figure 1. Cases 1 and 2 are pictured in figures 2 and 3. The analysis of Cases
3, 4, 5, and 6 can differ depending upon the size of the fixed level of e or y. These
situations are pictured in figures 4–11. To save space, the graph for the time path in
terms of aggregate effort is omitted from these latter figures because the results are
analogous to figures 2e and 3e (see below). As a reference point, the ZPC is pictured
as a thin line in all “a” graphs, and the operational e function for PMB is pictured as
a thin line in all “c” graphs.
Consider first Cases 1 and 2 in figures 2 and 3. As X decreases from K to Xbe,
the operational e function in Case 1 is the lower half of the ZPC, which has been
defined as emin(X). Below Xbe, the operational e function is e*(X). The number of days
fished, d, is equal to Dmax at all stock sizes. In Case 2, e*(X) is the operational e
function for all levels of X. The number of days fished will increase as X decreases
because profit per day decreases, so it takes more days to cover fixed costs. The op-
erational d will reach Dmax at Xbe. In both cases, boats will produce less total effort
than with PMB for all stock size above Xbe. Further, annual vessel effort increases as
stock size decreases in this range (see figures 2c and 3c). Given the way in which
vessels must be operated to come as close to achieving the profit goal as possible,
when X is less than Xbe boats will produce the same as with PMB. Also note that at
stock sizes above Xbe, e will be greater in Case 2. This means that with identical
stock and fleet sizes, catch will be higher in Case 2, which will have obvious bio-
logical effects on the operation of the fishery. This is an artifact of the daily cost
function. As daily effort decreases, the average cost of effort approaches v1 and is
independent of the total number of days fished. Therefore, since Case 1 will always
have a lower daily effort than Case 2, [emin(X) is less than e*(X)], its cost of effort
will be lower, and it will take a smaller annual catch to cover fixed costs. This
would not necessarily be the case if there were a fixed set-up cost included in the
daily cost function. Although these are hypothetical examples, the point (which is
confirmed in Cases 3 and 4) is that different operational rules for achieving the same
profit goal will have different effects on annual harvest levels.
Given the differences in the operational E functions in these two cases, the
PECs are different as well (see figures 2d and 3d). Over the range from K to Xbe, the
PEC is concave to the stock size axis. When stock size is less than Xbe, in both cases
the PEC is identical to the PEC for the PMB case because vessels effectively change
over to PMB in this range. The reason for the backward bending portion of the PEC
(where fewer boats are necessary to harvest the growth as stock size decreases) is
that each boat will be producing more effort. Depending on the parameter values,
this can occur whether growth is increasing or decreasing as stock size decreases. As
noted by Hannesson (1993), if the EEC intersects the PEC in a backward bending
region, it will produce an unstable equilibrium. When participants seek to achieve a
given profit goal, the EEC intersects the PEC at the cusp point where it switches
from a backward bending curve to a negatively sloped curve. It is important to note
it is not happenstance that equilibrium occurs at the cusp in the PEC. It is the direct
result of the nature of profit achievement goal, which requires that individual behav-Anderson 450
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ior must change when the stock reaches the economic equilibrium size. Below that
stock size, it is not possible to meet the profit goals and cover fixed cost. This
change in behavior as the stock fluctuates around the equilibrium size is an impor-
tant difference between the two types of behavior.
The time paths for these cases are also presented in figures 2d and 3d. Given the
baseline level of F, the only difference is that there is a larger open-access over-
shoot than with PMB. The reason for this is that with otherwise identical vessels
producing smaller amounts of effort, the stock will be able to support more of them
for a longer period of time before it is reduced to Xbe. The biological effects of the
increased overshoot in terms of vessels is accentuated by the fact that as the larger
fleet drives the stock down, the effort per boat of the larger fleet increases. Even
when the stock gets so low that vessels leave the fishery, as long as stock size is still
decreasing, effort per boat continues to increase which will partially offset the de-
crease in fleet size.
Figures 2e and 3e show the time path in terms of aggregate effort. At higher
stock sizes, aggregate effort is lower than with PMB. Compare figure 1e. However,
as the stock continues to decrease, the inequality is reversed. Also, aggregate effort
continues to increase until stock fall to Xbe, while aggregate effort can begin to de-
crease at higher stock sizes with PMB. If the comparative values for stock size were
plotted against time, it would show that while PMB results in a faster decline in X, it
does not fall as far, and it returns to the equilibrium stock size faster than with profit
goal achievement. Note also that in figure 2e, aggregate effort falls to zero at one
point because the stock falls below Xcush and the fleet temporarily ceases to operate.
The results with respect to total effort were similar in the remaining cases, so this
curve will not be displayed in the following figures.
Rows 2 and 3 of table 1 describe how sensitive the shape of the time path and
the stability of the system are to changes in the entry/exit coefficient. Case 1 be-
comes non-stable at a F¢ that is 1.75 times the baseline, and Case 2 at one that is
four times the baseline. In general, the greater proclivity to non-stability is due to
the fact that instead of having decreases in vessel annual effort complement the de-
crease in fleet as stock decreases, there is an increase which at least partially offsets
reduction in the fleet. The reason that Case 1 is more sensitive to changes in the co-
efficient is that the rate of increase in vessel annual effort is higher. See the slopes
of the curves in figures 2c and 3c.
In summary, while bioeconomic equilibrium will occur at the same combination
of fleet and stock size in Cases 1 and 2 as with PMB, there are important differ-
ences. First, the systems are much more sensitive to increases in F¢ with respect to
achieving a stable equilibrium. Second, the open-access overshoot extends to higher
fleet level, and this occurs even with the lower entrance rates.
Consider Case 3 where vessels set a constant e and modify the number of days
fished in order to achieve the profit goal. Figures 4 and 5 depict cases where the
fixed e is below and above ebe, the level of daily effort at the bioeconomic equilib-
rium with PMB. As noted above, the economic equilibrium stock size, Xbe(c3) in this
case, occurs where the operational e curve intersects the zero profit line. In both of
these cases, this occurs at a stock size greater than Xbe, the economic equilibrium
stock size with PMB. See the top two graphs in each figure. It follows, that as the
fixed e is increased, Xbe(c3) will initially decrease but after e reaches ebe further in-
creases will cause Xbe(c3) to increase. However, the size of Xcush(c3) will fall
continuously with increases in the level of fixed e (see table 2).
Again, d will increase with decreases in X and will reach Dmax at Xbe(c3). Given
that e is already fixed, this means that total effort per boat, E, will initially increase
with decreases in X, but will remain constant over the range between Xbe(c3) and
Xcush(c3). See figures 4c and 5c. There are some interesting aspects of the operationalAnderson 452
d curves that have significant effects on fishery operation. First, while e will be less
than the comparable PMB amount at higher stock sizes, at lower stock sizes when
vessels try to achieve a profit goal, there is a range where they will produce more
effort although they will stop operating at a higher stock size. Second, at higher lev-
els of the fixed e, the constant amount of E will be higher, but it will be produced
over a smaller range of stock sizes. That is, the difference between Xcush(c3) and Xbe(c3)
will decrease.
Because of these two points, there are important differences in the shape of the
PEC (see figures 4d and 5d). In both situations, the PEC will be concave to the stock
size axis over the range between K and Xbe(c3). Below Xbe(c3) it will be linear and
negatively sloped (see equation (12a), where the denominator is a constant over this
range of X). It is important to further note the explicit differences in the PEC. In
PMB and Cases 1 and 2, the PEC asymptotically approaches Xcush from above. How-
ever, in Cases 3 and 4, the PEC is linear and abruptly stops at Xcush. Vessels will not
operate below Xcush.
By comparing the two graphs, it can be seen that while the EEC intersects the
PEC at its cusp, with a higher fixed e, the concavity of the PEC is more pronounced
and the length of the linear portion is reduced (and partially hidden by the time
path). Given the parameter values used in this example, this has an effect on the
time path and the stability of equilibrium. Note that regardless of the level of fixed
e, the open-access overshoot is larger than with PMB. In addition, with the lower e,
and hence a lower Xcush, the time path, for the most part, stays above Xcush(c3). Also, at
the baseline F¢, the time path achieves an equilibrium. In fact, it would have to in-
crease to four times the baseline before the system becomes nonstable (see table 1).
The time path for the higher level of fixed e is much different. First, given the
smaller difference between Xcush(c3) and Xbe(c3), the time path falls below Xcush(c3) much
more frequently, which explains its saw-tooth shape. While the cushion prevents the
stock from falling further, the fishing industry is affected by periodic shutdowns.
Also, the system does not reach an equilibrium at the baseline F¢. The fishery will
go into a cycle, and while the stock is protected by Xcush(c3), there will be a continu-
ous pattern of boom and bust. During the bust, not only will the fleet size be falling,
but periodically it will not be profitable to fish at all. The likely reason for the
nonstability is the short length of the PEC below Xbe(c3). The system remains nonstable
even if the coefficient is reduced to 10% of the baseline level (see table 1).
A key issue with this case is that due to the constraint on days fished, there will
be a range of stock sizes where effort per boat does not change. This is important
because if effort per boat increases as stock size decreases, the PEC will have a
backward bending portion. But when effort per boat stays the same or decreases
with declines in stock size, the PEC has a negative slope. It is forward falling. To go
one step further, the higher the fixed level of e, the shorter the range of stock sizes
over which vessel effort will not change with stock size. And the shorter that range,
the shorter will be the forward falling portion of the PEC below the cusp and the
more difficult it is to obtain an equilibrium. This explains the difference between the
time paths in figures 4d and 5d at the baseline level of F.
The results of Case 4, where vessels set a fixed daily catch and then vary d to
obtain the profit goal, are depicted in figures 6 and 7. The operational e curve in-
creases with decreases in X because it takes more effort to maintain the fixed y with
lower stock sizes. Again, the economic equilibrium stock size (Xbe(c4) in this case),
will occur where the operational e curve intersects the ZPC. Figure 6 depicts a case
where y is “low” such that e is less than ebe at Xbe and it never reaches emax. In con-
trast, in figure 7 y is “high” and e is greater than ebe at Xbe and it does get as high as
emax. Note that it does so to the left of the point where it intersects the ZPC. It can be
seen that as the fixed y is increased, Xbe(c4) will initially fall until it reaches Xbe, andGoal Achievement Behavior 453
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then it will increase. At the fixed level of y where the operational e curve intersects
the ZPC at emax, the fixed y operational rule becomes equivalent to the fixed e rule
with e equal to emax, and further increases in y will no longer affect Xbe(c4). Note that
the operational e curve in figure 7a increases monotonically until the cushion stock
size is reached and production activity will cease. If the fixed level of y were to in-
crease by a small amount, the curve would shift up and the cushion stock size would
increase. The highest possible cushion stock size occurs at that level of y where the
operational level of e equals emax at Xcush(c4). Further increases in y will no longer af-
fect the size of Xcush(c4).
Figures 6c and 7c provide a comparison with the e curves for Case 4 with PMB.
As in Case 3, boats will produce less total effort at higher stock sizes, but over a
certain range of low stock sizes they will produce more. At low levels of fixed y, the
effort per boat curve will not have a flat portion. More importantly, effort per boat
will continue to increase with decreases in stock size at stock sizes below the
bioeconomic equilibrium level. Effort per boat will increase with decreases in stock
size until the cushion stock size is reached. In those cases, the PEC will be back-
ward bending below the cusp, which means that it will be impossible to obtain
equilibrium (see figure 6d). At higher levels of fixed y, it is possible for the effort
per boat curve to have a flat portion and for the PEC to be forward falling below the
cusp, which means that it is technically possible to have a stable equilibrium. At the
same time as the fixed y increases, the flat portion on the operational E curve and
the forward falling portion of the PEC below the cusp becomes short, making it
more difficult to obtain an equilibrium. In other words, if the operational e curve
hits emax before it intersects the ZPC, the analysis becomes the same as in figure 5
where there is a high level of fixed e. The time paths demonstrate the larger over-
shoot and show that the fishery will go through a continuous cycle of boom and bust
at both levels of fixed y. Again, sensitivity analysis showed that when F¢ is de-
creased to 10% of the baseline level, there is still a significant overshoot and in the
system remains nonstable (see table 1).
Cases 5 and 6 can be discussed in short order because of the similarity to Cases
3 and 4, respectively. The main differences will be in the b figures because d will
equal Dmax rather that the d that will cause net returns to just cover fixed costs. This
difference is further reflected in the c and d figures because of the effect it will have
on annual vessel effort and the PEC. In Case 5, depicted in figures 8 and 9, the an-
nual amount of effort is constant regardless of stock size and the PEC is linear and
negative throughout. The PEC is further to the right in figure 8 because boats pro-
duce less effort so the stock can sustain a larger fleet at any given size. Again, the
PEC terminates at Xcush, the level of which decreases with increases in the fixed level
of e. With a low level of fixed e, the time path is a stable node equilibrium at (and
below) the baseline entry/exit coefficient. The time path becomes a stable focus
when the coefficient reaches 1.5 times the baseline level and remains there over the
range of comparison.
With a higher level of fixed e, the time path is different partly due to the higher
level of Xcush (see the discussion of figure 5). At the baseline coefficient, it does fall
below Xcush on the way to achieving a stable equilibrium. However, a relatively small
increase in F¢ to 1.5 times the baseline will cause the system to become nonstable.
Case 6 is operationally the same as Case 4; there is a difference of degree rather
than kind. The daily effort function is the same in both cases, the difference is that d
is constant in Case 6; it does not increase with decreases in X as in Case 4. There-
fore, while in both cases the annual vessel effort will increase over some ranges of a
declining stock size, in Case 6 it will be greater than or equal to what it will be in
Case 4. As can be seen, the system is non-stable at the baseline (and lower) levels of
F¢ with both low and high fixed levels of y. As in Case 4, in the low y case, this isGoal Achievement Behavior 455
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due to the backward bending PEC. While in the high y case, it is due to the truncated
length of the negative sloped portion of the PEC below the EEC.
Other Issues Related to Profit Goal Achievement
Because GAB can potentially produce a larger open-access overshoot that will result
in larger fleet sizes and smaller stock sizes, to the extent that it exists in the fisheries
management problem may well be worse than if operators use PMB. Given the way
that both types of operators will function around equilibrium, it will be necessary to
remove more boats or put more strenuous controls on individual behavior with
GAB. Further, the stock rebuilding program may well start at a lower stock size.
There are other implications as well. One is the economic inefficiency effect. Not
only will there likely be more boats during the development of the fishery, but they
will be producing at less than their potential capacity. The economic wastes from
open access may be higher than previously thought.
A related point has to do with the current emphasis by FAO and other fisheries
organizations on obtaining measures of capacity for existing fisheries as an aid in
determining long-range management objectives and plans (FAO 1998). Undertaking
such studies is based on the assumption that PMB will generate incorrect results if
GAB is the norm. It is also possible that both types of behavior may be present in
the same fishery, which could make the problem even more difficult.
While this preliminary analysis has focused on open-access operation, the im-
plications for the predicted effects of various types of regulation are important as
well. For example, if managers try to reduce effort by implementing closed seasons,
they may have no or little success if vessel owners use GAB and if their current
level of d is less than Dmax. The regulation will reduce Dmax, but that may not affect
their current choice of the number of days to fish. Similarly, a license limitation pro-
gram would be less effective than anticipated if operators use GAB, because over
certain ranges of stock sizes, vessel effort would increase with decreases in stock
size. In both cases, there could be inequities if both types of participants were in the
same fishery.
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
The changes in the basic bioeconomic model which result from substituting GAB
for PMB are as follows. Instead of vessel annual effort decreasing as stock size
falls, it will do the reverse at least at stock sizes greater than economic equilibrium.
Depending upon the operational rule used to achieve the profit goal, the inverse re-
lationship between stock size and annual vessel effort can continue even at stock
sizes lower than economic equilibrium. While GAB will result in lower vessel effort
at higher stock sizes, depending on the operational rules, it can result in higher ves-
sel effort at lower stock sizes. It can also result in higher economic equilibrium and
cushion stock sizes. While this may appear to be biologically beneficial, the bottom
line effects depend upon overall fishery operation. It is likely that there will be a
larger open-access overshoot than with PMB. This means that even with a higher
cushion stock size, the stock size may reach lower levels. Because of the way GAB
affects the PEC and because of the relatively small differences between the eco-
nomic equilibrium and cushion stock sizes, the fishery may not be able to reach a
stable equilibrium, but will instead have a continuous pattern of boom and bust.
There may also be periods where the fleet completely stops fishing due to low dailyAnderson 458
net returns. These results should be interpreted with care. However, from table 1 it
can be seen from the example used here, compared to a baseline F that was well
within the stable range with PMB, there is no stable equilibrium in Case 3 with a
high e, and in Cases 4 and 6. This is true even with a F that is only 10% of the
baseline. At the other extreme, there does not appear to be strong difference in sta-
bility patterns in Case 5 with a low e. The remaining cases produced a stable
equilibrium at the baseline F, but the range over which it remained stable was much
shorter than with PMB.
Among other things, future research on this topic should focus on the funda-
mental question of whether goal achievement behavior is used by participants and, if
so, what goals are used and what sorts of operational rules are used to implement
them. It will also be useful to expand the open-access analysis by considering such
things as non-linear production functions, crowding externalities between vessels, a
variable price of output, etc. Finally, it will be necessary to provide a rigorous
analysis of how goal achievement behavior will affect the expected results of com-
mon regulation techniques.
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